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INTRODUCTION

Although all politicians are performers and inevitably find themselves on stage, some merely perform as marionettes, controlled by
hands holding strings of gold. Each time a politician acts, whether by
regulating zoning, rent, taxes, or anything else, a ripple is sent through
the economy. Winners and losers appear and, in the high stakes game
of political decision making, the gains and losses can be enormous.
Given these high stakes, it is not surprising that lobbyists and special
interest groups spend billions of dollars each year attempting to influence the votes of politicians. The incentive for politicians to take all
the money offered to them is also high, for the road to political success
is anything but cheap.1
Politicians who accept campaign contributions and other benefits,
however, must walk a fine line. Although our political system is fueled by campaign contributions and oiled by lobbyists, no politician
can be allowed to place his or her vote on the auction table. The very
concept is reprehensible to the democratic ideals upon which our nation was founded. One of the primary statutes used to prevent politicians from selling their votes is the Hobbs Act.2
The Hobbs Act provides, in relevant part: "Whoever in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."'3 The statute defines "extortion" as "[t]he obtaining of property from another with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."4
The "under color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act has
been used to convict public officials who have improperly used their
official powers to increase their personal wealth. When a public official enters into an expressly articulated agreement to perform or not
perform some official action in exchange for a benefit, the Hobbs Act
can be applied with little debate. Politicians, however, are rarely foolish enough to expressly articulate such agreements. Rather, the
1. For example, in their race for the United States Senate, Dianne Feinstein and Michael
Huffington spent almost $100,000 per day over an eleven month period, more than $27 million
altogether. R.W.Apple, Jr., Struggle for the Senate, N.Y. TIMns, Oct. 20, 1994 at Al, A12.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).

3. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994).
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agreements are generally made verbally under cloaks of innuendo and
ambiguity.
This paper first discusses the history of the Hobbs Act and its
evolution into a sometimes controversial tool used to convict public
officials. Next, the paper discusses the quid pro quo requirement necessary to prosecute an official using the "under color of official right"
language of the Hobbs Act. Although the United States Supreme
Court has addressed the quid pro quo requirements for a conviction
under the Hobbs Act twice this decade, the quid pro quo standard
remains ambiguous.' The ambiguity arises from the seemingly contradictory treatments of the standard in the two cases. While both cases,
United States v. McCormick and United States v. Evans, involved public officials who were convicted for extortion under the Hobbs Act,6
McCormick initially appears to require a stricter quid pro quo standard than Evans.7
Circuit courts that have attempted to define the current quid pro
quo standard in light of Evans and McCormick have provided different interpretations of the two cases. The main sources of division
among the circuits are: 1) whether Evans and McCormick provide different quid pro quo standards for campaign and non-campaign contribution cases and 2) precisely what quid pro quo standard should be
applied in each type of case. Most circuits have held that McCormick
applies to campaign contribution cases while Evans applies to noncampaign contribution cases. The majority of circuits also require a
stricter quid pro quo standard for campaign contribution cases than
for non-campaign contribution cases. However, after analyzing McCormick, Evans, the circuit courts, and social policy, this author concludes that the interpretation of the quid pro quo standard reached by
the majority of the circuit courts is incorrect. This author argues that
both Evans and McCormick apply to campaign contribution cases and
that the quid pro quo language in both cases can, and should, be
reconciled.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE HOBBS

AcT

Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in 1946 in response to the
United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Local 807
5.
second
6.
7.

The first of these cases was McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). The
case was Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 265.
Id. at 273; Evans, 504 U.S. at 267.
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InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters.8 Local 807 was a New York
chapter of the Teamsters Union which extorted money from out-ofstate truckers coming into New York City.9 As out-of-state truckers
entered the city, Local 807 would stop them and offer to help drive or
unload the trucks. 10 Local 807 then demanded payment regardless of
whether or not its offer was accepted." Although the out-of-state
truckers generally neither needed nor wanted assistance, they complied with the demands of Local 807 in order to get their loads
delivered.' 2
As a result of its activities, Local 807 was charged with violating
the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, which made it illegal to obtain "by
the use of... force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or
other valuable considerations, or the purchase or rental of property or
protective services, not including, however, the payment of wages by a
bona fide employer to a bona fide employee ....

",

Although the

actions of Local 807 clearly constituted extortion, the Supreme Court
held that, because payments to Local 807 constituted wages paid by a
"bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee," Local 807 had not vio14
lated the Anti-Racketeering Act.
Congress was outraged by the decision in Local 807 and responded by passing the Hobbs Act. 15 While the Hobbs Act, as originally enacted, defined extortion with the same "under the color of
official right" language used in the Hobbs Act today, "Congress spent
little time discussing the meaning of extortion under color of official
right."' 6 Thus, the courts, which looked to legislative intent to deter-

mine how broadly the Hobbs Act should be applied, gained little guidance from the brief and ambiguous congressional discourse on the
7

issue.1

8. 315 U.S. 521 (1942). Se4 e.g., Evans, 504 U.S. at 262; James Lindgren, The Elusive

Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 815, 889-90 (1988); GARY P. NAFrAUjS, WrnE COLLAR CRIMES 172 (1980); Charles

F.C. Ruff, FederalProsecution of Corruption:A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement
Policy, 65 GEo. LJ. 1171, 1174-75 (1977); 89 CONG. REa 3229 (1943); 91 CoNo. REc. 11,900-12.
9. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 525-27.
10. Id. at 525-27.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 525 (citing The Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 420(a) (1934)).
14. Id. at 535.
15. Lindgren supra note 8, at 889-90; see also 89 CONG. REc. 3229 (1943); 91 CONo. REc.
11,900-12.
16. Lindgren, supranote 8, at 890.
17. Id. But see, NAMrAus, supra note 8, at 177-78; James P. Fleissner, Note, Prosecuting
Public Officials Underthe Hobbs Act: Inducementas an Element of Extortion Under the Color of
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If Congress intended the "under color of official right" language
of the Hobbs Act to serve as a means to prosecute public officials for
extortion, such intent went unnoticed by prosecutors for at least
twenty five years after the Hobbs Act was passed.' 8 Until the early
1960s, all reported cases decided under the Hobbs Act involved labor
unions. 19 Prosecutors began to expand the use of the Hobbs Act in
the 1960s, but only to prosecute in cases where the extortion was attempted or accomplished through the use of duress.20 In fact, officials
charged with extortion under the Hobbs Act commonly defended the
charges by arguing that they used no duress to gain benefits and were,
therefore, merely accepting bribes.2 '
In 1972, in United States v. Kenny,' the Third Circuit affirmed the
first extortion conviction based upon the "color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act. Herbert Stem, the prosecutor in Kenny, argued that "the distinction between bribery and extortion that has
developed under the Hobbs Act is unnecessary when that Act is used
to prosecute corruption in public office."'2 3 Use of the "under color of
official right" language to prosecute public officials who received payments in exchange for official acts quickly gained support in the wake
of the Watergate scandal, which increased demand for vigorous prosecution of wayward public officials.24 The eventual expansion of the
Hobbs Act into a tool to prosecute public officials who received payments which were neither induced nor coerced
has led to bouts of
25
historical interpretation and scholarly debate.
Official Right, 52 U. Cm.L. REv. 1066, 1081-84 (1985) (arguing that although discourse on the

"under color of official right" language was brief, close analysis of the discussion indicates that
Congress did not intend the "under color of official right" language to be interpreted as broadly
as it has been interpreted by modem courts.).
18. Jan Hoth Uzzo, Note, Federal Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the
Hobbs Act: The Second Circuit Attempts to Define Inducement, 51 BROoK. L. Rnv. 734, 737
(1985); see also McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. NAFrAtiS, supra note 8, at 172.
20. Lindgren, supra note 8, at 817; Uzzo, supra note 18, at 737.
21. Uzzo, supra note 18, at 738 n.12; see also Herbert J. Stem, Prosecutionsof Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 4 (1971);

22. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); Fleissner, supra note 17,
at 1071.
23. Stem, supra note 21, at 17.
24. Lindgren, supra note 8, at 817; NAFrALuS, supra note 8, at 175.
25. Compare Evans, 504 U.S. at 278-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting) with Ruff supra note 8;
Joseph Maurice Harary, Note, Misapplicationof the Hobbs Act to Bribery, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1340 and compare NAmAus, supra note 8, at 177-78 with Lindgren, supra note 8 and Stem,
supra note 21.
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Although Congress did not enact the Hobbs Act until 1946, the
roots which gave life to the modern interpretation of the Act can be
traced to the 13th century.2 6 Historical interpretation of extortion and
bribery laws were of primary importance in both McCormick and Evans.2 7 The historical debate pits those in favor of a broad reading of
the Hobbs Act ("expansionists") against those who argue that the
Hobbs Act should not be used to convict public officials who passively
receive payments to which they are not entitled ("revisionists"). 2
Revisionists primarily support their position by arguing that extortion and bribery were distinct crimes under common law and that
they should remain distinct crimes today.2 9 The revisionists reject the
expansionist view that the "under color of official right" language of
the Hobbs Act brings passive acceptance of a payment, often thought
of as bribery, under the reach of the Hobbs Act.30 While the expansionists argue that bribery and extortion are essentially the same when
prosecuting "under the color of official right," the revisionists argue
that extortion has at least three separate characteristics which distinguish it from bribery.
First, revisionists argue that extortion requires coercion whereas
bribery does not.31 This contention is rejected by the expansionists,
who cite examples of common law convictions for extortion in the absence of coercion.32 Beginning with Kenny, American courts began to
accept the expansionist approach that, when a public official accepts
26. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 8, at 837-75 (analyzing modem interpretation of the
Hobbs Act through use of the common law and 13th century extortion statutes).
27. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 268; Evans, 504 U.S. at 261-68.
28. Lindgren, supra note 8, at 819. while Professor Lindgren coined the term "revisionist,"
the term "expansionist" is a creation of the present author.
29. See Harary, supra note 25. Justice Scalia's concurrence in McCormick and Justice
Thomas's dissent in Evans show that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are two of the most
notable revisionists.
The revisionists and expansionists also debate congressional intent in enacting the Hobbs
Act. Given the sparse congressional comment on the color of official right language, however,
this debate appears to be unresolvable. For discussion on each side of the debate compare Lindgren, supranote 8 with Evans, 504 U.S. at 278-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting) and Uzzo, supra note
18, at 737.
Similarly, the two sides debate the meaning of the statutory origins of the Hobbs Act.
Those who favor a restrictive reading of the Act argue that it was modeled after New York law,
under which bribery and extortion were distinct crimes. Ruff, supra note 8, at 1183. Those in
favor of a broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act concede that Congress looked to New York law
in drafting the Hobbs Act, but that Congress did not intend to enact New York law and, even if
they did, extortion and bribery overlapped under New York law. Lindgren, supranote 8, at 889906.
30. Harary, supra note 25; see also Evans, 504 U.S. 255 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Fleissner, supra note 17, at 1083.
32. Lindgren, supra note 8, at 884-86.
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an improper payment, the element of coercion is supplied by the
mere existence of the public official's powers of office.3 3 While debate
on this issue may continue to exist among scholars, the federal courts
now unanimously accept the view that public officials can be convicted
under the Hobbs Act even when they have taken no explicit actions to
coerce the payors of the benefits. 34
Second, in an argument similar to the coercion argument, the
revisionists maintain that extortion requires a showing of inducement,
whereas bribery can occur in the absence of such a showing. 35 Some
revisionists argue that if prosecutors do not have to show coercion to
convict a public official, prosecutors should, at the very least, have to
show that the public official induced the illegal payment.36 Under the
revisionist's view, passive acceptance of an illegal payment may be
bribery but it is not extortion and should not be prosecuted as extortion under the Hobbs Act. 37 Expansionists counter that, as with coercion, the powers inherent to a public office are sufficient to provide
the element of inducement.3" Therefore, the "under color of official
right" language permits public officials who passively receive benefits
in exchange for promises of official action or inaction to be convicted
under the Hobbs Act. Until the United States Supreme Court decided Evans in 1992, the issue of inducement was the source of division among the Circuit Courts. 39 In Evans, however, the Court
unambiguously held that a showing of inducement is not essential to
sustain the conviction of a public official under the Hobbs Act.40
Finally, the revisionists assert that extortion requires a showing of
false pretense. This argument was raised by Justice Scalia in his McCormick concurrence, 41 and was later advocated by Justice Thomas in
his Evans dissent, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined. 42 Under the false pretense argument, in order to be convicted
of extortion "under color of official right," the public official must
have held out that, on account of public office, he or she was entitled
to the benefit received.43 This argument, however, has been met with
33. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1295 (3d Cir. 1972); see Uzzo, supra note 18, at 738-42.
34. Evans, 504 U.S. at 258.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Uzzo, supra note 18, at 753-67; see also Fleissner, supra note 17.
Uzzo, supra note 18, at 753-67.
Id.
Lindgren, supra note 8, at 883-84.
Evans, 504 U.S. at 258-59.
Id. at 1883-84.
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Evans, 504 U.S. at 279 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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scholarly criticism and has been rejected by the majority of the
Court. 44

Professor James Lindgren has made probably the most direct and
well researched attack on the false pretense argument.45 Lindgren argues that the cases which Justice Thomas cites do not support the false
pretense argument.4 6 In Lindgren's view, "Justice Thomas's cases offer no support of any kind, merely showing that false pretenses is a
proper class of extortion case, not that false pretenses are necessary.
Indeed, two of the cases he cites, Dean v. State and Hanley v. State,
held more or less the opposite. ' 47 Lindgren's criticism of Justice
Thomas' historical interpretation is supported by the majority opinion
in Evans, as well as by Justice Kennedy's concurrence in which Justice
O'Connor joined.48
Indeed, writing for the majority of the Court in Evans, Justice
Stevens unequivocally rejected Justice Thomas' false pretense theory.
Justice Stevens wrote:
The dissent's theory notwithstanding, not one of the cases it cites
holds that the public official is innocent unless he has deceived the
payor by representing that the payment was proper. Indeed, none
makes any reference to the state of mind of the payor, and none
states that a "false pretense" is an element of the offense. Instead,
those cases merely support the proposition that the services for
which the fee is paid must be official and that the official must not
be entitled to the fee that he collected - both elements of the offense that are clearly satisfied in this case. The complete absence of
support for the dissent's thesis presumably explains why it was not
advanced by petitioner in the District Court or the Court of Appeals, is not recognized by any Court of Appeals, and is not advanced in any scholarly commentary. 49
The forceful rejection of Justice Thomas' historical perspective by six
of the Court's Justices, as well as by Professor Lindgren's thorough
44. James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practiceof the Bribery-Extortion Distinction,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1722-24 (1993).
45. The significance of Professor Lindgren's comments is evidenced by the majority's reliance on Lindgren in both the McCormick and Evans decisions, as well as Justice Thomas's criticism of Lindgren in the Evans dissent. See 500 U.S. at 268 n.6; 504 U.S. at 260 nn.4-6, 280-83
(Thomas J., dissenting).
46. Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1724.
47. Id. at 1723 (citing Dean v. State, 71 S.E. 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911) and Hanley v. State,
104 N.W. 57 (Wis. 1905), respectively).
48. Evans, 504 U.S. at 272, 275-78.
49. Id. at 270-71 (citation omitted).
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research, indicates that the false pretense argument is unlikely to be
used in the future.50

III. MCCORMICK - THE

"ExPLIcrr" QUID

PRO Quo

REQUIREMENT

McCormick involved a West Virginia State legislator, Robert L.
McCormick, who was convicted for extortion under the Hobbs Act.51
McCormick had been a strong supporter of a West Virginia program
which allowed doctors who had yet to pass their state licensing exams
52
to practice under temporary permits while studying for the exams.
Some doctors who were unable to pass the exams practiced medicine
for several years under this program.53 When discontinuance of the
program was threatened, a group of these doctors organized to seek
legislation "grant[ing them] permanent medical icense[s] by virtue of
their years of experience."54
McCormick, who was running for re-election during this same period, informed the doctors' lobbyist that, although "his campaign was
55
expensive,... he had not heard anything from the foreign doctors."
In response to McCormick's comment, the doctors remitted four cash
payments to McCormick over the course of the year. 56 McCormick
neither listed these payments as campaign contributions nor reported
the payments on his income tax return. 57 After his re-election, McCormick lobbied for the doctors' bill and, after the bill successfully
passed, the doctors gave McCormick one last payment. 58 McCormick
defended his actions by arguing that the payments were legitimate
campaign contributions and that he could not be found guilty unless
the government proved a "quid pro quo [-] a promise of official action or inaction in exchange for any payment or property received."59
The trial court disagreed and instructed the jury that:
50. Although two of these six Justices, Justice white and Justice Blackmun, no longer sit on
the bench, the majority of the Court will probably continue to reject the fairly novel false pretense argument. Accepting the false pretense argument would violate the principle of stare decisis and run counter to the historical interpretation of bribery and extortion.
51. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 259, 266.
52. Id. at 259.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 259-60.
55. Id. at 260.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
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[a] claim that a public official's actions would have been the same
whether or not he received the alleged payments is, for this purpose,
irrelevant and is no defense to the charges [of extortion].
So it is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant committed or promised to commit a quid pro quo, that is,
consideration in the nature of official action in return for the payment of the money not lawfully owed.6 °

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed McCormick's conviction, holdig that the government need not show a promise of official action or
inaction in exchange for any payment or property where the parties
never intended the payments to be "legitimate" campaign contributions.6 ' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the narrow
question of whether, in a campaign contribution case, an official can
be convicted under the "color of official right" language of the Hobbs
Act without proof of a quid pro quo.62 The Supreme Court appeared
to unanimously decide that proof of a quid pro quo was required.63
However, the Court split, 6-3, as to what this quid pro quo standard
should be.64
The majority of the Court held that, "[t]he receipt of [campaign]
contributions is also vulnerable under the Act as having been taken
under color of official right, but only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform
or not to perform an official act."65 The majority justified its strict
"explicit" requirement by arguing that campaign contributions are inherently part of our political system and:
to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when
they act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or
after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those
beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could
have meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another,
with his consent, 'under color of official right.'6
The majority did not, however, define what acts or articulations are
sufficient to constitute an explicit promise, nor did they address
whether a showing of quid pro quo is required in non-campaign contribution cases involving action taken under the color of official right.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 264 n.4.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266-67 n.5.
Id. at 273, 274.
Id. at 283, 286-87.
Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
Id. at 272.
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Scholars disagree on exactly what the Supreme Court meant by "explicit." Some scholars believe that the "explicit" standard will prevent
the prosecution from convicting some politicians even where the prosecution can show intent and knowledge to make an illegal exchange.6 7
Other scholars believe that the "explicit" standard "does not mean a
written or spoken promise or agreement necessarily, but rather, perhaps, a form of implicit understanding or undertaking in which the
parties are aware of the direct connection between the payment and
the anticipated future official action or inaction.168 Under this view,
little protection to public officials charged under
McCormick provides
69
the Hobbs Act.
The McCormick dissent captures the essence of this scholarly dispute.70 While the dissent in McCormick agreed that "it is essential
that the payment in question be contingent on a mutual understanding
that the motivation for the payment is the payer's desire to avoid a
specific threatened harm or to obtain a promised benefit that the defendant has the apparent power to deliver," the dissent felt that the
majority's "explicit" requirement was too stringent to be of practical
value.7 1 To illustrate its point the dissent drew an analogy to "a
known thug's offer to protect a storekeeper against the risk of severe
property damage in exchange for a cash consideration." 72 The dissent
stated that "[n]either the legislator nor the thug needs to make an
explicit threat or an explicit promise to get his message across."' 73 The
dissent argued that "[s]ubtle extortion is just as [harmful] - and probably much more common - than the kind of express understanding
that the Court's opinion seems to require."'74 According to the dissent, the critical issue in determining whether extortion has occurred
67. Thomas Regan McCartney, Note, McCormick v. United States: The Supreme Court Endorses Implicit Extortion by Elected Government Officials, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 181, 200-03

(1992) (stating that "the explicit requirement becomes virtually impossible to prove"); see also
Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1711 (providing examples of how intent and knowledge could be
shown without meeting the "explicit" requirement).
68. Michael W. Carey et al., Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: The
Obstacles to Punishing breaches of the Public Trust and a Proposalfor Reform, Part One, 94 W.
VA. L. REv. 301, 341 (1992); see also Eric David Weissman, Note, McCormick v. United States:
The Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 42 CATH.
U. L. REV. 433, 461-62 (1993) (arguing that jury must still determine if the payor intended
money to be a campaign contribution before "explicit" standard can be applied).
69. Carey, supra note 68, at 340-42.
%0. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent and was joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice
O'Connor. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 280.
71. Id. at 282-83.
72. Id. at 282.

73. Id.
74. Id.
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is the "candidate's and contributor's intent at the time the specific
payment was made." 75 Therefore, the dissent's quid pro quo standard
would only require a showing that the public official accepted the payment for an implicit promise of preferential treatment. 76
The dissent further argued that a public official commits extortion
even if the public official never acts to fulfill his or her end of the
bargain or even if the public official's actions would have been the
same without payment.77 Under the dissent's view, extortion occurs
at the time an official takes a benefit pursuant to an implicit or explicit
agreement to exchange official action for the benefit. 71 The fact that
the dissent's quid pro quo standard - intent of the parties as evidenced through either implicit or explicit communication - was not
adopted by the majority indicates that the majority's use of "explicit"
in McCormick must mean something more than the standard advocated by the dissent. Read alone, the "explicit" quid pro quo standard
of McCormick seems to require proof of more than just knowledge of
an illegal agreement.
One year after McCormick, however, the Court decided Evans, a
case which confused the quid pro quo standard as set out in McCormick. The majority's quid pro quo standard in Evans sounds more
like the standard advocated by the dissent in McCormick.79 In fact,
Justice Kennedy, -amember of the majority in both decisions, even
wrote a concurrence inEvans which nearly restated the quid pro quo
standard as advocated by the dissent in McCormick.8 ° To understand
which quid pro quo standard we are left with today, Evans and subsequent circuit court decisions must be analyzed.

75. Id. at 287.
76. Id. at 281-89.
77. Id. at 283.
78. Id.
79. The quid pro quo suggested by the McCormick dissent would require "that the payment
in question be contingent on a mutual understanding that the motivation for the payment is the
payer's desire to avoid a specific threatened harm or to obtain a promised benefit that the defendant has the apparent power to deliver.... 500 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added). Similarly, the
majority in Evans states that, "the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing the payment was made in return for
official acts." 504 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added).

80. Justice Kennedy wrote, "[t]he official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in

express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods" and
that "the trier of fact is quite capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or
actions taken as well as the reasonable construction given to them by the official and the payor."
504 U.S. at 274.
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IV. EvANs - THE

"KNOWING" STANDARD

John Evans "was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia."'" During an investigation of
public corruption in the Atlanta area, an undercover agent from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") approached Evans and asked
for assistance in rezoning a 25-acre tract of land.' Evans, who was
running for re-election at the time, told the FBI agent, in several conversations, that Evans needed money for his campaign. 3 Eventually,
Evans presented the FBI agent with a document showing Evans' outstanding campaign debts and his future anticipated expenses.' Evans
and the FBI agent then engaged in a fairly cryptic conversation in
which Evans at one point stated, "I've promised to help you. I'm
gonna work to do that. You understand what I mean."85 The facts do
not indicate, however, that Evans expressly stated that he would perform some official action in exchange for payments. Shortly after this
last conversation, and pursuant to Evans' instructions, the agent gave
Evans $7,000 in cash and a check for $1,000, payable to Evans' campaign. 6 Evans was subsequently charged and convicted of extortion
under the Hobbs Act.'
Although Evans challenged the trial court's quid pro quo instructions on appeal, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to address
that issue. Rather, the Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict
in the Circuits over the question whether an affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a demand, is an element of the offense of extortion 'under color of official right' prohibited by the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951."88 Thus, certiorari was granted in Evans
to determine whether the Hobbs Act was applicable to bribery, i.e.,
situations where a public official accepted, but did not solicit, benefits
in return for official action or inaction.8 9
81. Evans, 504 U.S. at 257.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 793 (11th Cir. 1990). The opinion from the Eleventh Circuit provides more factual background than does the Supreme Court opinion. As a
result, the background facts are taken from the Eleventh Circuit opinion.
84. Id. at 793.
85. Id. at 794.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 794-95.
88. Evans, 504 U.S. at 256. The Court left the inducement issue unresolved in McCormick.
See 500 U.S. at 268.
89. This issue was also raised in Justice Scalia's concurrence in McCormick.500 U.S. at 27779. Because the issue was not raised or briefed by the parties in McCormick,Justice Scalia did
no more than indicate that the Hobbs Act may not apply to bribery.
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The Evans decision provided a definitive answer on the inducement issue. The Court held that an affirmative act of inducement by a
public official, such as a demand, is not an element of the offense of
extortion "under color of official right" prohibited by the Hobbs
Act.90 The Court reasoned that, even without inducement by the public official, bribery of a public official falls under the definition of extortion because "the coercive element is provided by the public office
itself." 91
While settling the inducement issue, however, Evans revived the
conflict concerning the quidpro quo requirement. In addition to challenging his conviction on the issue of inducement, the petitioner in
Evans argued that his conviction could not be sustained because the
trial court's instructions "did not properly describe the quid pro quo
requirement for conviction if the jury found that the payment was a
campaign contribution."' The Court rejected the petitioner's criticism of the trial court's quid pro quo instructions and affirmed the
extortion conviction against him.93 In so doing, the Court made two
separate holdings concerning the quid pro quo issue.
First, the Court determined that an act of extortion "is completed
at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for
his agreement to perform specific acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo
is not an element of the offense." 94 Thus, an official who never actually takes an affirmative step to perform or not perform official action
in return for a benefit is nonetheless guilty of extortion if the public
official simply agreed to such a step.
Second, the Court expressly stated what the government must
show to satisfy the Court's quid pro quo element. The Court wrote,
"[w]e hold today that the Government need only show that a public
official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing
90. 504 U.S. at 268.
91. Id. at 266.
92. Id. at 268. The instructions challenged by the petitioner were most likely those stating:
Thus the acceptance by an elected official of a campaign contribution does not, in itself,
constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act even though the donor has business pending
before the official.
However, if a public official demands or accepts money in exchange for [a] specific
requested exercise of his or her official power, such a demand or acceptance does constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act regardless of whether the payment is made in the
form of a campaign contribution.
Id. at 258 (quoting the instructions of the trial court).
93. Id. at 268.
94. Id.
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that the payment was made in return for official acts."95 The Court,

however, did not clearly state what effect, if any, this "knowing" language has on the "explicit" language of McCormick.
Significantly, the Court did not re-analyze the facts of the case
and scarcely referred to any conversation between Evans and the FBI
agent. Instead, the Court stated: "we assume that the jury found that
petitioner accepted the cash knowing that it was intended to ensure
that he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and that he
would try to persuade his fellow commissioners to do likewise."9 6
This quote indicates that the Supreme Court will affirm a Hobbs Act
conviction as long as the Court is satisfied that the jury found the defendant to accept a benefit knowing that the benefit was in exchange
for some official action. The Court's affirmation of Evans' conviction
in the absence of an express articulation to exchange official conduct
for a benefit is extremely significant in determining how Evans should
be applied to future cases.
V.

RECONCILING EVANS WITH MCCORMICA'

WHETHER THE

CASES MUST BE READ TOGETHER OR APART

After the Supreme Court decisions in Evans and McCormick, a
conflict emerged regarding how the language of the two opinions
should be reconciled.97 The use of "knowing" in Evans seems to indi-

cate that, as long as an official knew that he was being given a benefit
in return for an official act, it does not matter whether the agreement
to do the official act was explicit or implicit. McCormick, however,
clearly states that the quid pro quo requirement can only be met by an
explicit agreement. Although the potential McCormick-Evans quid
pro quo conflict is central to an analysis of Hobbs Act violations prosecuted "under color of official right," surprisingly few scholars have
commented upon this potential conflict. 98 In fact, the only non-student article directly addressing the quid pro quo conflict was written
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 257.
97. The conflict is evidenced by the contrasting interpretations among the circuit courts. See
text accompanying notes 109 through 200.
98. Lindgren, supranote 44, at 1737 is the only article to discuss what effect, if any, Evans
has on McCormick. Lawrence D. Finder and Joel M. Androphy discuss Evans and McCormick
in their article, Crimes and Campaign Contributions,30 Hous. LAW. 32 (June 1993), but do not
specifically address the possible effect of Evans on McCormick. Similarly, a Note by Charles N.
Whitaker, FederalProsecutionof State and Local Bribery: InappropriateTools and the Need for a
Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REv. 1617 (1992), discusses both McCormick and Evans, but
does not provide an in depth discussion of how Evans might affect McCormick.
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by Professor James Lindgren in 1993. 9 In contrast to the sparse academic publication on the topic, several district courts have recently
addressed which quid pro quo standard should be applied in cases
where public officials have been charged with extortion under the
Hobbs Act. 100
Since Evans, the majority of circuit courts confronted with public
official extortion cases have not attempted to reconcile McCormick
and Evans.'0 1 Instead, these courts have avoided the potential McCormick-Evans conflict by holding that the two cases apply to different situations.' 0 2 The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all
indicate that they will use Evans as the guide for non-campaign contribution cases, and McCormick as the guide for campaign contribution
3
0

cases.1

However, in the recent case of United States v. Blandford, the
Sixth Circuit stated that both McCormick and Evans should apply to
campaign contribution cases. 1°4 The Sixth Circuit then went on to
successfully complete the arduous task of reconciling McCormick and
05

Evans.1

The Blandford court's reconciliation of the McCormick and Evans decisions may cause the Blandford decision to become a model for
future cases in which public officials are convicted under the "color of
official right" language of the Hobbs Act. Indeed, prior to Blandford
the Fourth Circuit took a view similar to that of the Second, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits. 0 6 Since Blandford, however, the Fourth Circuit appears to have reversed its earlier position and has apparently
adopted a view more consistent with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in
99. Professor Lindgren advocates a somewhat flexible quid pro quo requirement. He states
that, "[i]n Evans, the Court has moved away from an explicit quid pro quo to a much less strict
reciprocity requirement." Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1738. Medrith Lee Hager recently addressed the quid pro quo conflict in a note. Medrith Lee Hager, Note, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining the DistinctionBetween a Bribe and a Gift, 83 Ky. LJ. 197 (1995).
100. United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d
543 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 108 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995).
101. See Allen, 10 F.3d at 411; Martinez, 14 F.3d at 553; Davis, 30 F.3d at 109; Garcia,992
F.2d at 410-13; Coyne, 4 F.3d at 105-09; Taylor, 993 F.3d at 384-85.
102. See Allen, 10 F.3d at 411; Martinez, 14 F.3d at 553; Davis, 30 F.3d at 109; Garcia,992
F.2d at 410-13; Coyne, 4 F.3d at 105-09; Taylor, 993 F.3d at 384-85.
103. See Allen, 10 F.3d at 411; Martinez, 14 F.3d at 553; Davis, 30 F.3d at 109; Garcia,992
F.2d at 410-13; Coyne, 4 F.3d at 105-09; Taylor, 993 F.3d at 384-85.
104. Blandford, 33 F.3d at 695-98.
105. Id.
106. See Taylor, 993 F.2d at 385.
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Blandford.10 7 A review of circuit court decisions demonstrates that
the approach to the quid pro quo issue taken by the Fourth Circuit
and Sixth Circuits best advances public policy and best complies with
the intent of the Supreme Court as expressed in Evans. 08
VI.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT: EXCLUSIVE APPLICATION OF MCCORMICK
TO CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION CASES

The Seventh Circuit recently considered which quid pro quo standard is required in campaign contribution cases, and indicated that
McCormick, uninfluenced by Evans, governs campaign contribution
cases.' 0 9 United States v. Allen arose from the conviction of Clemmons Allen, an internal affairs investigator for a sheriff's office in Indiana. 110 Allen was found guilty of providing protection to an illegal
gambling operation in return for cash payments."' Allen claimed that
these payments were merely innocuous campaign contributions." 2
In determining what constituted extortion "under color of official
right" the court said that extortion occurs "if the official knows that
the bribe.., is motivated by a hope that it will influence him in the
exercise of his office and if, knowing this, he accepts the bribe.""' 3
Although this quote came from a 1987 Seventh Circuit decision, the
court supported the language with a string cite to Evans, which was
decided in 1992. The court then stated that:
the Supreme Court in McCormick added to this definition of extortion the requirement that the connection between the payment and
the exercise of office - the quid pro quo - be explicit... absent

some fairly explicit language otherwise, accepting a campaign contribution does not equal taking a bribe unless the payment is made

107. See United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995).
108. Since Evans, the Eighth Circuit has issued two opinions in Hobbs Act cases involving
public officials. The cases are United States v. Evans, 30 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 1994) and United
States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993). Neither of these cases, however, provide discussion on the potential McCormick-Evans quid pro quo conflict. Similarly, in United States v.

Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal from a conviction
under the "color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act. However, the Fifth Circuit ultimately decided that the defendant was not a public official and therefore could not be convicted
under the "color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act. Id. at 1383. As a result, the case is
not useful to the present analysis and will not be considered. The First, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and
Washington D.C. Circuits have not had occasion to address the potential McCormick-Evansquid
pro quo conflict.
109. See United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 407-08.
111. Id. at 408.
112. Id. at 410.
113. Id. (quoting United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other
grounds, 484 U.S. 807 (1987)).
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in exchange for an explicit promise to perform or not to perform an
official act. Vague expectations of some future
benefit should not
4
be sufficient to make a payment a bribe."
The irony in the court's analysis is that the court cites Evans in support of a definition which the court claims was modified by McCormick, which was decided in 1991. Because Evans was decided after
McCormick, the court should have addressed the effect that Evans
had on the McCormick standard, not the effect that McCormick had
on the Evans standard. It appears that, under its current analysis, the
Seventh Circuit will apply the "explicit" standard of McCormick to
campaign contribution cases without consideration of how Evans
might affect this standard.
VII.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: SEPARATION OF MCCORMICK

FROM EVANS

In 1994, the Eleventh Circuit twice spoke on the quid pro quo
standard; first in United States v. Martinez,"5 and shortly thereafter in
a rehearing of United States v. Davis." 6 Read together, these two
cases indicate that the court will have to apply both McCormick and
Evans to non-campaign contribution cases, but will apply only McCormick to campaign contribution cases.
Martinez involved a Florida mayor, Raul Martinez, who used his
power over zoning regulations to force local realtors to sell him property well below market value.11 7 At trial, the court instructed the jury
that extortion occurs, "if the official knows he had been offered the
payment in exchange for the exercise of his official power, or that such
payment is motivated by hope of influence."" 8 Martinez argued that
the instruction was in error because, under McCormick and Evans,
the government must prove the existence of an explicit promise and
that the above instruction allowed for a conviction in the absence of
any quid pro quo." 9 The government first responded that Evans controlled the case and then made the tenuous argument that Evans does
120
not require the government to prove a quid pro quo.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Allen, 10 F.3d at 411 (emphasis added).
14 F.3d 543, 553 (11th Cir. 1994).
30 F.3d 108 (11th Cir. 1994).
14 F.3d at 544-45.
Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's position by holding that McCormick exclusively applied to Martinez.121 The court also
stated that "after McCormick, the Court issued Evans, where it considered whether a quid pro quo was required outside the context of
campaign contributions" and that "Evans modified [the McCormick]
,,1 The court ultistandard for non-campaign contributioncases ....
mately concluded that the instructions to the jury were in error because they "failed to properly inform the jury that the government
must prove the existence of a quid pro quo in order to find Martinez
guilty.' 23 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that the Hobbs
Act requires evidence of a quid pro quo to convict an official for extortion "under the color of official right.' 2 4 However, the court's determination that Evans applies to non-campaign contribution cases
and is separate from McCormick, can be questioned.
Six months after deciding Martinez, the Eleventh Circuit issued a
decision in United States v. Davis (hereinafter Davis2)'25 where the
Eleventh Circuit reversed its previous decision which had affirmed the6
conviction of Davis in United States v. Davis (hereinafter Davisl).1
The case involved an Alabama legislator, Patricia Davis, who was
charged with conspiring to extort money in return for help in getting a
bill out of her committee. Davis argued on appeal that the quid pro
quo instructions given to the jury did not satisfy the requirements of
McCormick. The instructions stated that a Hobbs Act violation occurs "[by] taking or offering to take or agreeing to take or withhold
."7
"..
The court in Davisi affirmed
official action for the money .
"is near enough to the
this
language
that
holding
Davis' conviction,
'explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to
While the
perform an official act' outlined in McCormick ....
court did not indicate that this relaxed interpretation of the quid pro
quo standard was a response to the recent decision in Evans, the court
nonetheless gave a liberal reading to the quid pro quo requirement set
121. Id. at 553.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 554.
124. See Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1733-38 (finding that Evans requires a quid pro quo).
But see Whitaker, supra note 98, at 1634-35 (arguing that the phrase "in return for" as used in
Evans does not necessarily indicate the existence of a quid pro quo requirement).
125. 30 F.3d 108 (11th Cir. 1994).
126. 967 F.2d 516 (1lth Cir. 1992). Davisl and Davis2 were written by the same panel of
judges.
127. Id. at 521 (citing instructions by the district court).
128. Id.
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forth in McCormick. On rehearing, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed Davisi and stated that "under United States Supreme Court
precedent, an explicit promise by a public official to act or not act is
an essential element of Hobbs Act extortion. 129 This language can
arguably be viewed as an indication that the Eleventh Circuit intends
to apply the McCormick "explicit" standard to non-campaign contribution cases such as Davis2, as well as to campaign contribution cases.
Indeed, the court actually cited Evans, which the court classified as a
non-campaign contribution case in Martinez, as a source supporting
the proposition that an "explicit promise" is an essential element of
Hobbs Act extortion. 130 Furthermore, while citing Evans, the court
or in any way referred to the "knowing" lannever acknowledged
31
guage of Evans.Despite the court's analysis in Davis2, the Eleventh Circuit probably does not intend to recognize the McCormick "explicit" standard
in non-campaign contribution cases exclusive of the "knowing" language in Evans. 32 Applying McCormick in such a manner would run
counter to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Martinez and to the clear
language of the Supreme Court in Evans. 33 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit will probably not continue to disregard Evans in its analysis of
non-campaign contribution cases. Because the Eleventh Circuit has
applied both McCormick and Evans to non-campaign contribution
cases, it appears that in future non-campaign contribution cases, the
court must reconcile the "knowing" language of Evans with the "explicit" language of McCormick. Doing so would bring the Eleventh
Circuit more in line with the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, and would
allow the Eleventh Circuit to avoid overruling Davis2.
In contrast to the confusion the Eleventh Circuit precedent has
created in non-campaign contribution cases, the Eleventh Circuit's approach to campaign contribution cases is unambiguous. The Eleventh
Circuit opinion in Martinez makes it clear that the Eleventh Circuit
will apply McCormick, without reference to Evans, in campaign contribution cases.

129.
130.
131.
132.
explain
133.

Davis, 30 F.3d at 109.
Id.at 109 n.1.
Id. at 109.
It should be noted that Davis2 was only a two paragraph opinion which did not fully
the court's rationale.
504 U.S. at 268.
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SECOND CIRCUIT: EXCLUSIVE

APPLICATION OF EVANS TO

NON-CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION CASES

The Second Circuit has issued three opinions since 1993 which
demonstrate that the Second Circuit will decide non-campaign contribution cases exclusively by reference to Evans.' The first of the
three decisions, United States v. Garcia, involved a New York Congressman who was charged under the Hobbs Act with extorting
money from companies in return for assistance in obtaining government contracts. 35 The second case, United States v. Coyne, concerned
a county executive charged with receiving a $30,000 payment in return
for helping an architectural firm to gain a government contract. 136 Finally, in the third case, United States v. Delano, the government
charged the Commissioner of the Parks Department of the City of
Buffalo with extortion for ordering employees under
his control to
37
perform work on private homes and businesses.
The Second Circuit determined that the "knowing" quid pro quo
standard of Evans controlled each of the above cases.' 38 The court
further determined that the language in McCormick was irrelevant be139
cause McCormick applied only to campaign contribution cases.
The court stated: "Evans modified [the McCormick] standard in noncampaign contribution cases by requiring that the government show
only 'that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not
entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official
acts."' 40 The Second Circuit did not, however, indicate whether Evans also modified the standard for campaign contribution cases.
Even so, the court's interpretation of Evans in Coyne, Garcia,
and Delano, makes it doubtful that the Second Circuit can now apply
Evans to campaign contribution cases. This is true because the Second Circuit's interpretation of Evans cannot be reconciled with McCormick, which incontrovertibly applies to campaign contribution
cases. 141 The Second Circuit in Garcia wrote, "[a]lthough no explicit
agreement . ... need have been shown, the government must have
134. United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409
(2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720 (2d Cir. 1995).
135. Garcia,992 F.2d at 410-13.
136. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 at 105-09.
137. Delano, 55 F.3d at 722-23.
138. Garcia,992 F.2d at 415; Coyne, 4 F.3d at 111, 113-14; Delano, 55 F.3d at 731.
139. Garcia,992 F.2d at 414.
140. Id. at 415 (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. 255 at 268).
141. The Supreme Court expressly limited McCormick to campaign contribution cases. 500
U.S. at 274 n.10.
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shown that Garcia received the payment 'knowing that [it] was made
in return for official acts." ' 14 2 Similarly, in Coyne, the court stated:
"[p]roof of an explicit promise at the time of payment to perform certain acts is not necessary, and the jury was free to infer that Coyne
accepted the $30,000 knowing that it was payment related to his using
his influence as County Executive on Crozier's behalf .... ,143 Similarly, in Delano, the court held, "[c]ontrary to Delano's contention,
however, [proof of an explicit promise] to perform the official acts in
return for the payment is not required."' 144 McCormick, on the other
hand, states that campaign contributions taken under the color of official right are vulnerable under the Hobbs Act "only if the payments
are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.' 14 5 Because Garcia,
Coyne and Delano expressly state that under Evans an "explicit promise" is not required and McCormick expressly states that an "explicit
promise" is required, the Second Circuit cannot easily reconcile McCormick and Evans.
In order to apply Evans to campaign contribution cases, the Second Circuit would have to take one of two unlikely actions. First, the
court could revise its interpretation of Evans as set forth in Garcia,
Coyne, and Delano. Second, the court could maintain its present interpretation of Evans and further find that Evans overrules McCormick, so that any conflict between the Second Circuit's interpretation
of Evans and the language of McCormick would be irrelevant. The
latter finding, however, would be extremely bold. McCormick and
Evans were issued only one year apart, three of the same Justices were
on the majority in each case, and nowhere does Evans indicate that it
overruled McCormick. Thus, while the Second Circuit has yet to decide a post-Evans campaign contribution case, it appears that when
presented with such a case the Second Circuit, like the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits, will determine that Evans does not affect the McCormick quid pro quo standard in campaign contribution cases.
IX.

SIXTH CIRcurr: RECONCILING MCCORMICK AND EVANS

The Sixth Circuit diverged from the other circuits and, in deciding
United States v. Blandford, developed a more logical approach toward
142.
143.
144.
145.

Garcia,992 at 415 (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 268) (emphasis added).
Coyne, 4 F.3d at 111 (citations omitted).
Delano, 55 F.3d at 731.
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273.
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resolution of Hobbs Act cases. 46 Unlike the circuit court cases preceding Blandford, the Sixth Circuit held that both McCormick and
Evans apply to campaign contribution cases and that McCormick and
Evans are reconcilable. 147 In 1990, Donald J.Blandford was the
Speaker of Kentucky's House of Representatives.' 48 Blandford was
also the target of an FBI investigation concerning public officials suspected of extorting cash payments in exchange for help in blocking
1 49
restrictive "breed-to-breed" regulation on the horse racing industry.

As a result of the FBI investigation, Blandford was arrested and convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act.' 50
Payments to Blandford on three separate occasions formed the
basis for the extortion charges against him.'' The first payment occurred when William McBee, an FBI informant, handed Blandford
52
$500 which McBee described as "walking around" money.'
Although McBee "did not mention breed-to-breed legislation" at this
time, he testified that "on at least one prior occasion" he had given
money to Blandford which Blandford knew was given with the intent
to influence Blandford's position on breed-to-breed legislation.'53
The second payment occurred during a dinner party at Spurrier's
hotel suite; McBee gave Blandford another $500 in one of the bedrooms.' 54 While handing over the money, McBee told Blandford,
"[h]ere's a little something from Mr. Spurrier and me and the harness
so forth. 1 5 5 Blandford replied, "All right. Well
horse people and..,
1 56
that's wonderful!"'
The final payment occurred at a second dinner party in Spurrier's
hotel suite. 57 McBee gave Blandford another $500 but, as the Sixth

Circuit stated, "McBee was only marginally less cryptic than before
to informing Blandford about the reason behind the
when it came
'158
payment.'
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 695-98.
Id. at 688-89.
Id.
Id. at 688, 698.
Id. at 689-90.

152. Id.

153.
154.
tucky's
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 690. John "Jay" Spurrer was a prominent Frankfurt lobbyist who chaired KenHarness Racing Commission and who had been recruited by the FBI. Id. at 688-90.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On appeal of his conviction, Blandford argued that "[t]he instructions [the District Court gave to the jury] were in error because [the
instructions] did not require the jury to find that [Blandford] had entered into an explicit agreement... to oppose breed-to-breed legislation.' 1 59 The Sixth Circuit could easily and simply have rejected this
argument by holding that Blandford is not a campaign contribution
case and that the explicit requirement of McCormick is expressly limited to campaign contribution cases. Instead the Sixth Circuit performed a thorough analysis of McCormick and Evans, and adopted a
quid pro quo standard consistent with both cases. 60
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that
"[e]xactly what effect Evans had on McCormick is not altogether
clear.' 16 ' The court, however, felt that analysis of that effect as determined by the Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits was incorrect. 162
The Sixth Circuit stated:
The federal circuit courts that have considered the matter assume
that [Evans] establishes a modified or relaxed quid pro quo standard to be applied in non-campaign contribution cases. Under this
view, the comparatively strict standard of McCormick still would
govern when the alleged Hobbs Act violation arises out of the receipt of campaign contributions by a public official. These courts
evidently assume, without
63 engaging in any rigorous analysis, the validity of their position.
The Sixth Circuit then made two conclusions. First, the court concluded that Evans does not address what quid pro quo is required in
non-campaign contribution cases. 64 The court felt that Evans was a
campaign contribution case, and that therefore, the question of what
159. Id. at 693. The district court gave a jury instruction which quoted directly from Evans.
The district court instructed the jury:
[E]xtortion means the obtaining of property, to which one is not entitled, from another
with that person's consent, under color of official right. A public official commits extortion when he obtains a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the
payment was made in return for his official acts.
[To find the defendant guilty, the government must prove] that the defendant intended
to obtain property or a payment to which he was not entitled with the knowledge that
the property or payment was being given in return for an official act or an exercise of
his official authority in regard to legislation potentially including Breed to Breed
provisions.
Id. at 698 (emphasis omitted) (alterations in original).
160. See id. at 696-97.
161. Id. at 695.
162. Id. at 695-96. At the time Blandford was decided, the Fourth Circuit held a view similar
to that of the Second and Eleventh Circuits.
163. Id. at 695.
164. Id. at 696-97.
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quid pro quo is required in non-campaign contribution cases remains
unanswered. 65 Second, the court concluded that "Evans provided a
gloss on the McCormick Court's use of the word 'explicit' to qualify
its quid pro quo requirement."'1 66 Thus, the Sixth Circuit felt that Evans helped define, rather than confuse, the quid pro quo requirement
set forth in McCormick.167 While the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that

Evans did not apply to non-campaign contribution cases is questionable, the court's more important conclusion, that Evans helped to define the "explicit" quid pro quo standard of McCormick,6 ' is practical
and well-reasoned.
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's conclusion, Evans probably does
establish a quid pro quo standard for both non-campaign and campaign contribution cases. The Court worded Evans much more
broadly than McCormick and, unlike in McCormick, never implicitly
169
or explicitly restricted its holding to campaign contribution cases.
Regardless of whether Evans is limited to campaign contribution cases
or not, however, Evans effectively sets a ceiling on the rigidity of the
quid pro quo standard in non-campaign contribution cases. 170 This is
because "non-campaign contribution cases ...

are perhaps less, but

clearly not more, difficult to prove [than campaign contribution cases]
from the government's standpoint, [and] the same showing of a quid
pro quo also would suffice."117 1 By holding that Evans does not necessarily apply to non-campaign contribution cases, the Sixth Circuit simply stated that no standard higher than the "knowing" quid pro quo
standard of Evans can be required in either campaign or non-campaign contribution cases.
The more significant determination of the Sixth Circuit, however,
is that McCormick and Evans can, and should, both be applied to
165. Id.
166. Id. at 696.
167. See id. at 696.
168. Id. at 696.
169. Compare McCormick, 500 U.S. at 271-73 with Evans, 504 U.S. at 267-69. See also Whitaker, supra note 98, at 1632-34. See infra part XI, "Efficacy of Combining McCormick and Evans" for further analysis.
170. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have both held that Evans only applies to non-campaign contribution cases. See text accompanying footnotes 115 through 145 for a discussion of
the Second and Eleventh Circuit cases. See, eg., United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 553
(11th Cir. 1994) (stating that "Evans modified [the McCormick] standard for non-campaign contributions."). The Fourth Circuit has held that Evans applies to both campaign and non-campaign contribution cases. See text accompanying footnotes 179 through 199. The views of these
courts support the argument that Evans should apply to campaign contribution cases.
171. Blandford,33 F.3d at 697.
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campaign contribution cases. 7 2 The Sixth Circuit reconciled the "explicit" standard of McCormick with the "knowing" standard of Evans
by stating:
Explicit, as explained in Evans, speaks not to the form of the agreement between the payor and payee, but to the degree to which the
payor and payee were aware of its terms, regardless of whether
those terms were articulated. Put simply, Evans
instructed that by
'explicit' McCormick did not mean 'express. ' 173
The court cited the definitions of "explicit" and "express" as found in
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY to support this interpretation of the meaning of "explicit."' 174 The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of "explicit," as
used in McCormick, is also supported by the fact that Justice White,
who wrote McCormick, was also in the Evans majority. 175 One must
assume that the Supreme Court would not write two opinions, one
year apart, which conflict on such an essential and specific issue as the
quid pro quo requirement in extortion cases. By joining the Evans
majority without comment on the "knowing" standard as set out in
Evans, one also might assume that Justice White did not view the
"knowing" standard of Evans to be in conflict with the "explicit" standard of McCormick. Furthermore, the fact that only the approach
taken by the Sixth Circuit can successfully reconcile McCormick and
Evans lends credibility to the Sixth Circuit's interpretation.
The Evans clarification of McCormick leads to the conclusion
that: "the quid pro quo of McCormick is satisfied by something short
of a formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual arrangement
(i.e., merely knowing the payment was made in return for official acts
is enough)."'176 Given this standard, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Blandford's Hobbs Act conviction because "a rational juror could have
surmised that Blandford accepted the payments despite being aware
that his acceptance would engender certain expectations on the part
of the payor."'1 77 Thus, as its strictest possible quid pro quo standard
required to support a conviction, the Sixth Circuit only requires evidence upon which a rational juror could infer that a public official
knew he or she made an agreement to exchange official action for
benefit. This language should not, however, be read as concluding
172. Id. at 696.
173. Id.

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 696 n.13.
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 259; Evans, 504 U.S. at 256.
Blandford, 33 F.3d at 696.
Id. at 699.
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that a public official commits extortion just because the official accepts a contribution knowing that the contributor has expectations of
official action or inaction. 178 In order to be convicted, the prosecutor
must also show a quid pro quo, that the public official agreed to official action or inaction in return for the payment. Blandford does,
however, leave open the possibility that, in non-campaign contribution cases, public officials charged with extortion under the Hobbs Act
can be convicted without any showing of a quid pro quo.'7 9
X.

FOURTH CIRCUIT: ADOPTION OF
RECONCILIATION

THE BLANDFORD

Since Evans, the Fourth Circuit has decided two cases involving
public officials convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act. In the
first case, United States v. Taylor, the court took a position similar to
that taken by the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. 8 0 However, in the second case, United States v. Hairston, the court took a
position more similar to that of the Sixth Circuit.' 8 ' Analysis of the
two cases demonstrates an evolution to a more lucid and rational quid
pro quo standard in extortion cases brought under the "color of official right" language of the Hobbs Act.
Taylor arose from the conviction of Luther Langford Taylor, Jr., a
member of the South Carolina House of Representatives.' s 2 Taylor
was convicted for illegally accepting payments in return for assistance
in passing a bill which would legalize parimutuel betting at race tracks
in South Carolina.' 3 Taylor argued that the payments were nothing
more than permissible campaign contributions and that the conviction
could not stand because the trial court did not "describe the quid pro
quo required by McCormick for a conviction if the jury found that the
payment was a campaign contribution."'18 The district court had instructed the jury that:
In order to find the defendant guilty of an attempt to commit extortion under color of official right, you must be convinced beyond a
178. The Blandfordcourt noted that "[it would be naive to suppose that contributors do not
expect some benefit - support for favorable legislation, for example - for their contributions."
Id. at 694 n.11 (quoting United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1993)).

179. Id. at 696-97.
180. 993 F.2d 382, 384-85 (4th Cir. 1993).
181. 46 F.3d 361, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1995).
182. 993 F.2d at 382-83.

183. Id.
184. Id. at 383.
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reasonable doubt that at the time payments were made to the defendant he was aware that the payments were intended to influence
his official conduct. 185
The Fourth Circuit determined that this instruction did not comply
with either McCormick or Evans because "[a]ll payments to elected
officials are intended to influence their official conduct" and "[t]he
above instructions would allow the jury to convict upon a finding that
the payments were made to Taylor simply because he held office
.... ,"186 Close analysis of the trial court's instructions indicate that the
Fourth Circuit was correct in determining that because the instruction
did not require a finding that Taylor agreed to perform an official action or inaction in return for the payments, the instruction was
deficient. 187
The more significant aspect of Taylor, however, is that the court
interpreted McCormick and Evans as providing two separate quid pro
quo standards. At trial, the jury in Taylor was instructed to determine
whether or not the payment to Taylor was a campaign contribution.1 88
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit indicated that if the payment was not a
campaign contribution, the Evans standard would apply. 189 After setting forth the Evans standard, the court then stated, "[o]r, if the jury
finds the payment to be a campaign contribution, then, under McCormick, it must find that 'the payments are made in return for an explicit
promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an
official act""..9 Analysis of the language used by the Fourth Circuit in
Taylor shows that the court intended to separate Evans from McCormick. First, using the disjunctive to separate the Evans quid pro quo
standard from the McCormick standard shows that the court viewed
Evans and McCormick as setting forth separate standards. 191 Second,
the court exclusively cited to McCormick when setting forth the quid
pro quo standard governing Thylor.192 Evans is more recent than McCormick, so if the Fourth Circuit had intended Evans to apply to campaign contribution cases, the court would have cited Evans when
describing the quid pro quo standard in campaign contribution cases.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit stated that the trial court's instruction was
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 385 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 384-85.
See id. at 385.
Id. at 385 (quoting McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273).
Id.
Id.
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"not sufficient under either McCormick or Evans."' 9 3 Had the court
intended McCormick and Evans to be read together, the court would
not have applied the cases with "either-or" language.
In the more recent case of Hairston,however, the Fourth Circuit
indicated that McCormick and Evans are both campaign contribution
cases. 194 Hairston arose when defendant Patrick Hairston appealed
his conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act. 9 5 Hairston was a
member of the Board of Alderman in Winstom-Salem, North Carolina, which decided city zoning matters and provided city contracts. 96
Hairston was convicted for using his power over zoning and city contracts to extort payments to charitable organizations with which Hairston was associated. 197 Because Hairston was never charged with
extorting campaign contributions, the case was indisputably a noncampaign contribution case.
Contrary to what one might expect after the Taylor decision,
however, the court did not decide Hairstonby summarily holding that
Evans controlled non-campaign contribution cases. Instead, the court
determined Evans to be a campaign contribution case which, nonetheless, applied to non-campaign contribution cases because "the Court
wrote broadly enough to require proof of a quid pro quo in all cases
charging extortion under color of official right."'9 8 By recognizing
Evans as a campaign contribution case, the court necessarily grouped
Evans with McCormick, which was also a campaign contribution
case. 199 Thus, under Hairston,campaign contribution cases before the
Fourth Circuit must now be decided by reading McCormick and Evans together.

193. Id.
194. 46 F.3d at 364, 372-73.
195. Id. at 364-65. Hairston was one of several defendants in this case. For simplicity, however, this paper only considers the case as is relates to Hairston.
196. Id. at 364.
197. Id. at 364-73.
198. Id. at 372-73 (emphasis added).
199. Despite the fact that the Fourth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, found Evans to be a
campaign contribution case, the Hairstoncourt cited to Blandfordthrough use of a "But cf." cite.
46 F.3d at 365. The "But cf." cite, however, only indicates that, unlike the Sixth Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit viewed Evans as being worded so broadly as to apply to non-campaign as well as
campaign contribution cases.
The Fourth Circuit did not acknowledge that Hairston represents a change in position from
Taylor. Yet, unlike the court in Hairston,the court in Taylor separated McCormick and Evans
and only cited McCormick as authority in campaign contribution cases. See infra part X, the
discussion of Taylor in this section.
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The Fourth Circuit did not, however, indicate whether non-campaign contribution cases, such as Hairston,can be decided without reference to McCormick. Because the Supreme Court expressly limited
McCormick to campaign contribution cases, one can argue that McCormick should have no effect on non-campaign contribution cases.
Therefore, one can argue that, in the Fourth Circuit, the quid pro quo
standard in non-campaign contribution cases may be lower than the
quid pro quo standard in campaign contribution cases. Indeed, in deciding Hairston the Fourth Circuit may not have considered the McCormick quid pro quo requirement that payments be made "in return
for an explicit promise or undertaking."200
However, even though McCormick does not apply to non-campaign contribution cases, one should not apply Evans to non-campaign contribution cases without consideration of McCormick.
Regardless of whether Evans is applied to a campaign contribution
case or to a non-campaign contribution case, the controlling "knowing" language of Evans is still the same. When Evans is applied to
campaign contribution cases, this language must be read together
with, and modified by, McCormick. Thus, if a more liberal interpretation of the "knowing" language is applied to non-campaign contribution, courts must give two different interpretations of the same
language from the same case. If so, the subject of the pending case
will determine how to analyze the legal precedent rather than the
legal precedent determining how to analyze the pending case. Legal
precedent should not be a variable controlled by the facts of the case
before the court, and therefore, only one interpretation of the Evans

200. The instruction given in Hairstonbarely qualifies as setting forth a valid quid pro quo
requirement. See 46 F.3d at 373. The judge gave the following instruction at trial:
The term 'under color of official right' is the wrongful taking by a public officer of
money or property not due to his office, whether or not the taking was accomplished by
force, threats, or use of fear. In other words, while the mere acceptance of voluntary
contributions by public officials is not extortion under color of official right, the wrongful use of otherwise valid official power may convert lawful action into unlawful extortion. So, if a public official accepts things of significant value to which he was not
entitled, and which he knows were given to him with the expectation of influencing his
conduct of his public office, such action would constitute extortion.
Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted). The last sentence standing alone probably does not provide a
sufficient quid pro quo standard, but the court determined that the instruction as a whole, while
"not a model for future cases ... adequately conveyed the necessity of proof of a quid pro quo
." Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
While the above instruction is probably valid within a liberal reading of the "knowing"
standard, the instruction may not have held up under the "knowing" standard as modified by the
"explicit" standard of McCormick.
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"knowing" language should exist. Furthermore, the best interpretation of the "knowing" language is a product of reading McCormick
and Evans together.
XI.

EFFICACY OF COMBINING MCCORMICK AND EVANS

Although it is a minority view among the circuits, the interpretation that Evans applies to both campaign and non-campaign contribution cases is the most rational view. Evans should be applied to
campaign contribution cases because Evans actually involved alleged
campaign contributions.2 ° ' One of the payments in Evans involved a
$1,000 check made payable to the defendant's campaign. The defendant in Evans also claimed that the entire $8,000 he received was a
campaign contribution. 20 2 Given the check made payable to defendant's campaign, and a "campaign contribution" defense to the extortion charges, it is difficult to understand how Evans can be interpreted
as to apply only to non-campaign contribution cases.
Nowhere in its decision does the Supreme Court state that Evans
is not a campaign contribution case or that Evans should not be applied to future campaign contribution cases. In fact, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that one basis for the appeal in Evans concerned
the petitioner's allegation that the trial court "did not properly describe the quid pro quo requirement for conviction if the jury found
that the payment was a campaign contribution. ' 20 3 As Justice Kennedy writes in his concurrence in Evans: "[r]eaders of today's opinion
should have little difficulty in understanding that the rationale underlying the Court's holding applies not only in campaign contribution
cases, but in all 18 U.S.C. § 1951 prosecutions. 2 " 4
A close reading of Evans also indicates that the Court intended
Evans to be reconciled with, rather than separated from, McCormick.
In addressing the adequacy of the trial court's quid pro quo instruction, the Evans Court stated that the instruction "satisfies the quid pro
201. Evans, 504 U.S. at 257.
202. Id.

203. Id. at 268.
204. Id. at 278. The fact that none of the other Justices joined Kennedy in his concurrence
should not be interpreted as an indication that Kennedy stands alone on his view of the quid pro
quo standard. The main focus of Evans involved inducement, and Kennedy took a position on
the inducement issue different from the majority of the Court. The fact that the Kennedy concurrence is not joined by any of the other Justices is most likely a reflection of Kennedy's disparate views on the inducement issue. Kennedy's view on the quid pro quo issue is not much
different than the view advocated by Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court in
Evans. See Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1735.
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quo requirement of McCormick .... .2 o If the Court had wanted
Evans and McCormick to apply to different situations and to be read
separately, the Court would not have intermingled the two cases as it
did. The language of the Court's decision and the fact that Evans involved alleged campaign contributions indicates that Evans should be
read with, rather than separate from, McCormick.
XII.

SOCIAL POLICY: CONSIDERATIONS IN CHOOSING
A QUID PRO QUO STANDARD

Selling a vote can be compared to selling any other piece of property.20 6 A sale is a contract requiring an offer, an acceptance, and
some consideration. Selling a vote, however, has at least one crucial
distinction from legally selling a piece of property. While society has
an incentive to require proof of the legal sale through express terms,
society has a contrasting incentive to allow proof of the illegal sale
through less than express terms. 20 7
Society requires expressness in its legal contracts because it wants
the terms of these contracts to be clear.208 If people are fully informed when signing contracts, fewer disputes will subsequently arise
over the contracts. Thus, a requirement of expressness perpetuates
the end a contract is designed to achieve.209
Requiring expressness as proof of a criminal sale, however,
defeats the end which society is trying to achieve.210 In contrast to
legal sales, those involved in criminal sales (whether of votes, drugs,
or stolen property) have an incentive to establish their contracts in
non-express terms. 21 ' If the law requires these terms to be express in
order to gain convictions, law enforcement can be frustrated by agreements made through "winks and nods. ' 2 12 The issue in criminal contracts is not an issue of what was said, but an issue of what was
understood.
205. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. This quotation addressed the issue of whether a public official
must take an affirmative step towards fulfilling the quid pro quo; the quotation arguably does
not address whether the trial court instructions met the "explicit" requirement of McCormick.
Nonetheless, the fact that the Court feels Evans and McCormick must be read together on any
aspect of the quid pro quo issue is significant.
206. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 273-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1733.
208. Id.

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Thus, the development of a quid pro quo standard revolves
around the issue of intent.213 The quid pro quo standard which we
choose will depend upon how difficult we wish to make the prosecutor's burden of proving intent. Reading McCormick as requiring an
express articulation establishes a high prosecutorial burden. An express articulation standard does not allow a jury to infer intent based
upon the facts; intent must be self-evident, as shown through the express articulation.
Those in favor of a high quid pro quo standard cite the historical
importance of and practical need for contributions to support political
campaigns.' 4 Under this view, "the importance of amassing monies
for broad-based political campaigns outweighs the burden on society
caused by the few cases in which the government will be unable to
show a quid pro quo. 21 5 One can further argue that an express quid
pro quo standard still leaves the jury with room for debate on the
issue of intent.2z 6
Assume that the expressness standard would only take effect in
campaign contribution cases. If so, for the expressness standard to
take effect, the jury would have to first determine that the parties intended the payment to be a campaign contribution.217 If the jury determined that the parties never intended the payment to be a
campaign contribution, the more stringent quid pro quo requirement
would never be implicated. 1 s
Even using the above reasoning, however, a politician who received campaign contributions conditioned on an agreement for official action or inaction could avoid prosecution by simply stating the
agreement in non-express terms. Those who advocate a quid pro quo
standard which would allow a jury to infer a non-express agreement
argue that any less stringent standard would make it too easy for corrupt officials to escape prosecution under the Hobbs Act.2 1 9 Since the
213. Most scholarly commentators, regardless of what quid pro quo standard they advocate,
recognize intent as a crucial issue. Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1733-37; Finder & Androphy,
supra note 98; Weissman, supra note 68, at 461; McCartney, supranote 67, at 198-204; Carey et
al.,
supra note 68, at 340-42.
214. Weissman, supra note 68, at 460; see also McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.
215. Weissman, supra note 68, at 462.
216. Id. at 461.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lindgren, supra note 44, at 1734
(stating that "in government corruption, only idiots or targets of government stings are likely to
make things explicit"); McCartney, supranote 67, at 202 (stating that "a politician would have to
be ignorant or apathetic to make direct promises of legislative benefit in exchange for payment"
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inception of the jury system, juries have undertaken the onerous task
of inferring intent from the facts. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend
why we should suddenly retract this responsibility from the jury in
cases where public officials are charged with extortion under the
Hobbs Act. The prosecution's high burden of establishing intent beyond a reasonable doubt provides public officials with the same guarantees of trustworthiness always associated with our criminal justice
system.
A fair and effective quid pro quo standard must allow politicians
to legally solicit funds which are vital to our political system and allow
prosecutors to effectively prosecute those politicians who extort or sell
their official power. Because the standard draws such a fine line, the
standard must also be sufficiently lucid that politicians have adequate
notice of what conduct will be considered illegal.
To determine how various interpretations of the quid pro quo
standard would work, consider two hypotheticals which, I argue,
straddle the line between permissible and impermissible conduct:
(1) The National Rifle Association (NRA) contributes a substantial
sum of money to the campaign of Senator Smith. Senator Smith
knows that the NRA expects him to vote favorably to the NRA's
position on any upcoming gun legislation. Despite this knowledge,
Senator Smith never implicitly nor explicitly indicates that his vote
will be influenced by the donation.
(2) Same facts as in Hypothetical (1), except the money is given to
Senator Jones, who takes the money pursuant to a mutual non-express understanding and agreement that Senator Jones will vote favorably to the NRA's position on any upcoming gun legislation.
In the first hypothetical, Mr. Smith does not take the money conditional to an agreement to vote in any certain way. Although Mr.
Smith knows that the NRA is giving him the money because the NRA
would like Mr. Smith to vote in line with the NRA's agenda, Mr.
Smith makes no agreement to perform a quid pro quo and, therefore,
does not act illegally. In the second hypothetical, Mr. Jones does
make an agreement, although not expressly articulated, to perform an
official action in exchange for the contribution. Mr. Jones sold his
vote and, therefore, I argue, acts illegally.
If a strict interpretation of the McCormick quid pro quo standard
is applied to Hypothetical (2), the fact that Mr. Jones did not expressly
articulate his agreement would allow Mr. Jones to escape conviction.
and that "[t]he explicit requirement becomes virtually impossible to prove, and thus emasculates
the Hobbs Act").
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Such an interpretation would allow politicians smart enough to implicitly state their agreements to commit extortion with immunity. In
contrast, the "knowing" standard of Evans would allow a jury to convict Mr. Jones of extortion under the Hobbs Act.
Evans, however, states that a public official can be convicted for
receiving a payment "knowing that the payment was made in return
for official acts."22 In Hypothetical (1), even though Mr. Smith never
made a quidpro quo agreement, he, arguably, did know that the NRA
expected official acts in return for the campaign contribution. Thus,
under a liberal reading of Evans, Mr. Smith could be convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act.22 1 While Mr. Smith may act wrongfully
in not expressly informing the NRA that their contribution will not
affect his vote, Mr. Smith makes no agreement and has no intention of
letting the NRA's contribution affect his vote. Therefore, it would be
unjust to convict Mr. Smith for extortion under the Hobbs Act.2 22
The best quid pro quo standard comes from reading McCormick
and Evans together, rather than separately. Read together, an explicit
quid pro quo must be shown. The term "explicit," however, simply
means "not obscure or ambiguous, having no disguised meaning or
reservation. Clear in understanding."''2 3 Thus, if a prosecutor presents
facts to a jury which permit that jury to infer an unambiguous understanding between the official and the payor, the explicit requirement
can be met. Because understanding of an unambiguous quid pro quo
agreement cannot be shown in Hypothetical (1), Mr. Smith could not
be convicted under the Hobbs Act. Mr. Jones, however, could be convicted even if he and the NRA never expressly articulated their quid
pro quo agreement.
When McCormick and Evans are read together, the resulting
product is a well defined quid pro quo standard which strikes a balance between the politician's need to legally solicit contributions and
the government's need to effectively prosecute politicians who charge
220. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. The payments which the Supreme Court refers to are "payment[s] to which [the public official] was not entitled." Id. Because payments received in return
for an official act are, by definition, payments to which the official is not entitled, this language
does not add to the Supreme Court's holding.

221. By stating that Evans could be read in this manner I do not suggest that Evans should
be read in this manner.
222. One should note, however, that because the Court expressly limited McCormick to
campaign contribution cases, the requirement that Evans be read together with McCormick only
exists in campaign contribution cases. Thus, the added protection of McCormick might not exist
in non-campaign contribution cases.
223. United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 696 n.13 (6th Cir. 1994) (alterations in original)
(citing BLACK's Lmv DicnoNARY 579 (6th ed. 1990)).
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for their votes. While effectively applied by the Sixth Circuit in
Blandford, and by the Fourth Circuit in Hairston, this quid pro quo
requirement is best expressed by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence
in Evans.'- 4 Justice Kennedy wrote:
a public official violates [the Hobbs Act] if he intends the payor to
believe that absent payment the official is likely to abuse his office
and his trust to the detriment and injury of the prospective payor or
to give the prospective payor less favorable treatment if the quid
pro quo is not satisfied. The official and the payor need not state
the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect
could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.., the trier of fact
is quite capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or actions taken as well as the reasonable construction given to
them by the official and the payor.2 2s
This standard allows the jury to determine intent and to fulfill its role
as the trier of fact - the role upon which our judicial system is founded.
This standard also protects politicians by requiring strong proof of a
quid pro quo agreement but does not emasculate the Hobbs Act by
requiring an express showing of the quid pro quo agreement.
The quid pro quo requirement advocated by Justice Kennedy and
applied by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits is the only quid pro quo requirement under which McCormick and Evans can be reconciled.
That the Supreme Court intended the two cases to be reconciled in
this manner is evidenced by the fact that three of the same Justices
who advocated the "explicit" standard in McCormick also advocated
the "knowing" standard in Evans.1 6 We must assume that our
Supreme Court Justices are rational and would not issue two irreconcilable opinions on a single issue within a one year period.

XIII. CONCLUSION
The status of the quid pro quo requirement in cases involving
public officials charged with extortion under the Hobbs Act has been
in disarray since the Supreme Court issued the Evans decision in 1992.
For two years after the Supreme Court decided Evans, circuit courts
avoided any attempt to reconcile McCormick with Evans by failing to
acknowledge that both cases involved campaign contributions. Avoiding the potential McCormick-Evans conflict by only applying Evans to
224. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274.
225. Id.

226. Justices white, Souter, and Kennedy were members of the majority in both McCormick
and Evans. 500 U.S. at 259; 504 U.S. at 256.
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non-campaign contribution cases may have been an easy solution, but
it was not the correct solution. The two cases must be reconciled.
Fortunately, the Sixth Circuit addressed the facts of Evans and McCormick and found a way to reconcile them. The solution of the Sixth
Circuit provides a practical and effective approach to the quid pro quo
requirement. The requirement properly emphasizes intent as the crucial element to be proved and correctly empowers the jury to infer
that intent from the facts. Support for the Sixth Circuit's position was
provided by the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Hairston. More
importantly, however, the Fourth Circuit opinion demonstrates that
circuit courts in conflict with the Sixth Circuit may be willing to reverse their positions and avoid the need for yet another Supreme
Court opinion on the quid pro quo issue.
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